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This paper studies the interaction between Mexico's capital account and
domestic credit policy during the decade 1970-1980. It seeks in particular
to measure the offset to monetary policy caused by interest-sensitive
capital flows, and, in doing so, is careful to account for the potential
estimation bias introduced by central bank sterilization activities. The
empirical record suggests that the instantaneous capital account offset to
monetary policy, while substantial, was less than complete in the 1970s.
The Banco de Mexico's short-run control of the monetary base allowed it
to sterilize international reserve movements, at least over part of the
decade.
Empirical studies of offsetting capital flows have concentrated almost
exclusively on the industrialized, North Atlantic economies.
1 But the
impact of capital mobility on domestic monetary management is of great
importance for Mexico, which until August 1982 had allowed relatively
unrestricted external asset trading, and for other industrializing econo-
mies which have only recently removed impediments to capital account
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transactions. Argentina, for example, experienced substantial capital
inflows and real exchange rate appreciation as a result of the disinflation
policy it pursued in the late 1970s. Sterilization might mitigate these
problems during the transition to lower inflation rates in countries (such
as Uruguay) following strategies similar to Argentina's.
Broadly speaking, the econometric approaches taken in the industrial-
ized country studies of the capital account offset may be classified either
as "reduced form" (Porter 1972; Kouri and Porter 1974; Girton and
Roper 1977) or "structural" (Herring and Marston 1977; Obstfeld
1980a).
2 In this paper, we apply the structural approach to the recent
Mexican experience in order to avoid the simultaneous equations bias
that may distort reduced-form offset estimates in the presence of a
sterilization rule. The structural model estimated is a partial equilibrium
model of financial markets, however. As such, it can yield at best a partial
picture of the channels through which monetary policy was offset over the
longer run.
An additional feature of our econometric technique deserves mention.
Along with the standard two-stage least squares estimates of the Mexican
structural equations, we present estimates based on the two-step, two-
stage least squares procedure proposed by Cumby, Huizinga and Obst-
feld (1981). The theoretical advantages of the latter estimator are dis-
cussed in context below.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 11.1 distinguishes between
offsetting capital movements and systematic sterilization as possible
causes of an empirical negative correlation between capital inflows and
increases in the domestic source component of the monetary base. We
briefly review the reduced-form approach to the offset in the light of
possible contemporaneous feedback from the balance of payments to the
central bank's domestic assets.
Section 11.2 describes our empirical measure of domestic credit expan-
sion and estimates a quarterly Banco de Mexico reaction function relating
changes in the domestic source component of the high-powered money
stock to the balance of payments and the public sector borrowing require-
ment. We find that reserve flows were a significant determinant of domes-
tic credit movements in the 1970s and are unable to reject the hypothesis
that sterilization of reserve flows was complete, at least over the second
half of the decade.
Section 11.3 estimates the parameters of a small, aggregative model of
Mexico's money market and capital account. The underlying portfolio
balance model of the capital account assumes that peso-denominated,
nonmoney assets and covered foreign assets are imperfect substitutes in
2. The paper of Argy and Kouri (1974) does not fall easily into either of these categories.
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portfolios and allows for the gradual adjustment of portfolio shares to
their desired values. The empirical results imply that, depending on how
the increase in the money supply was effected, anywhere between 30 and
50 percent of an expansion in domestic credit was offset by capital outflow
in the same quarter. The offset would have been higher had asset markets
adjusted fully within one quarter.
Section 11.4 briefly discusses the extent to which a systematic rela-
tionship between domestic credit movements and the futures premium on
foreign exchange might alter the results of section 11.3. The data reveal a
pronounced relation between the futures premium and lagged deviations
from purchasing power parity. We argue that expectations concerning
possible peso devaluation were the major determinant of the premium.
3
The implication is that the external offset to monetary policy was prob-
ably exacerbated through channels not captured in our partial-
equilibrium, financial-sector model.
Section 11.5 contains some concluding remarks. An appendix de-
scribes the construction of the data series employed in this study.
11.1 Sterilization and the Capital Account Offset
When the exchange rate is pegged and international capital movements
are sensitive to interest rate differentials between countries, the capital
account response to domestic monetary measures diminishes their effect
on the monetary base. An expansion of domestic credit, say, exerts
downward pressure on domestic borrowing costs, inducing a reduction in
net private foreign indebtedness and a central bank reserve loss that
offsets some fraction of the intended increase in the base. When domestic
and foreign securities are perfectly substitutable and portfolios adjust
instantaneously, this offset is complete and immediate: the central bank
possesses no control over the domestic money stock.
4
Both imperfect substitutability between interest-bearing assets of dif-
ferent currency denomination and imperfect mobility of capital between
financial centers may afford a central bank some short-run monetary
independence. Neither necessarily enables the central bank to peg the
price level or money supply indefinitely (see Obstfeld 19806). Imperfect
3. The peso was devalued on August 31, 1976. A second devaluation occurred on
February 18,1982; and a third, on August 5,1982, was accompanied by capital controls and
the establishment of a two-tier foreign exchange market.
4. See Keynes (1930, vol. 2, p. 309) and Mundell (1963). A key assumption in deriving
this result is that the central bank expands domestic credit through an open-market
operation that leaves private wealth unchanged. If domestic credit creation augments
private wealth and the public's demand for money is a function of its wealth, the capital
account offset will not be complete, even under perfect capital mobility and unlimited asset
substitutability. Below, we compute the empirical offset coefficients associated with both
types of domestic credit creation.248 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
substitutability can arise if various risks render stochastic the perceived
returns on domestic and foreign assets. When this is so, the desired
portfolio share of domestic bonds in domestic wealth is an increasing
function of the home interest rate; and the central bank can influence this
rate (and so, the demand for money) by varying the stock of outside
domestic currency debt available to private wealth owners.
5 Costs associ-
ated with rapid portfolio adjustment may allow international interest rate
arbitrage to occur only over time. Thus, imperfect capital mobility
affords the monetary authority a second means of temporarily influencing
domestic credit conditions. The model of Mexico estimated below allows
for both possible sources of short-run interest rate independence in the
presence of international asset trade.
The offset to monetary policy gives rise, empirically, to a negative
correlation between the capital account surplus and increases in the
domestic component of the base. Figure 11.1 plots the change in Banco
de Mexico's reserves against the seasonally adjusted change in domestic
credit and is suggestive of such a negative correlation in the Mexican
case.
6 But the absolute magnitude of this correlation, by itself, is not
evidence of a powerful capital account offset. Central banks frequently
take advantage of any short-run monetary control they possess to sterilize
reserve flows. Their attempts to divorce the balance of payments from the
high-powered money supply introduce an additional source of systematic
negative correlation between domestic credit and capital inflows. A
sterilization rule increases reserve volatility, but can successfully counter-
act balance of payment influences on the money supply in the short run
when the capital account offset is incomplete. Under sterilization, there is
a systematic contemporaneous feedback from the balance of payments to
the domestic assets of the central bank. These two variables are jointly,
endogenously determined by the preferences of private asset holders and
the monetary policy reaction function of the central bank.
Attempts to measure the offset coefficient—the fraction of any domes-
tic credit increase offset by capital outflow over the relevant time hori-
zon—have often failed to account for sterilization, and instead view the
domestic source component of the base as a predetermined variable for
purposes of estimation. Studies adopting this assumption produce esti-
mates of the offset which reflect the central bank's policy as well as the
true capital account response to domestic credit expansion; but they
erroneously ascribe the computed correlation exclusively to the latter.
This is true in particular of the "reduced-form" approaches to the offset
5. Even when foreign and home bonds are imperfect substitutes, the central bank may
be unable to control the monetary base if government debt is not outside debt; see Obstfeld
(1982a) and Stockman (1979). We ignore below the problems that can arise when the public
internalizes the government and central bank budget constraints.
6. The series are adjusted for reserve requirements as described in section 11.2.249 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
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Fig. 11.1 Banco de Mexico: changes in domestic and foreign assets
(billions of pesos).
coefficient, which use ordinary least squares to regress the capital account
surplus on the contemporaneous increase in domestic credit, the current
account surplus, and the exogenous determinants of changes in the
external asset position and the domestic interest rate (usually the contem-
poraneous change in the foreign interest rate and home income).
7 When
the monetary authority pursues a sterilization policy, the resulting least
7. The reduced-form capital flow equation, as estimated by Kouri and Porter (1974), is
derived in two steps. First, one writes the change in net external lending over a quarter as a
function of the changes in the foreign and home interest rates and the changes in income and
other determinants of the capital account. Second, one eliminates the change in the
domestic interest rate from this equation using the (first-differenced) money-market
equilibrium condition, which relates the quarterly change in (base) money demand to the
sum of the capital account, the current account, and the increase in central bank domestic
assets. It is of course possible that the change in home income is not a predetermined
variable; and if income is not predetermined, ordinary least squares estimates of the
reduced-form capital flow equation are inconsistent even if domestic credit policy is unre-
lated to the balance of payments. However, the assumption that income is predetermined is
traditional in the empirical literature on offset coefficients. A similar problem arises if the
current account is falsely taken to be a predetermined regressor. That problem can be
avoided by moving the current account variable to the left-hand side of the capital flow
equation and estimating an offset equation in which the change in international reserves is
the dependent variable. Such an equation captures the current account as well as the capital
account offset to domestic credit creation.250 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
squares estimate of the domestic credit variable's coefficient is not a
consistent estimate of the offset coefficient, for that variable is correlated
with the capital-flow equation's disturbance term. The bias this correla-
tion imparts to the estimated offset is discussed by a number of authors,
including Argy and Kouri (1974), Magee (1976), Girton and Roper
(1977), Murray (1978) and Obstfeld (1980a, 19826).
Empirical equations which express changes in foreign reserves as a
function of changes in domestic credit, changes in income, and changes in
the home interest rate (e.g., Cardoso and Dornbusch 1980) are clearly
money-demand equations, and thus can give no information regarding
the effect of credit expansion on the capital account. (See Frenkel,
Gylfason, and Helliwell 1980, among others, for discussion of this point.)
Balance of payment equations such as the one estimated by Connolly and
Dantas da Silveira (1979), which assume that income is predetermined
and that money demand and the money supply multiplier are interest
inelastic, assume implicitly that the external offset to domestic credit
expansion is complete.
8
In section 11.2 we estimate a Banco de Mexico monetary policy reac-
tion function. The results provide strong evidence that the Mexican
authorities pursued a systematic policy of full sterilization during at least
the second half of the 1970s. To avoid the bias this might introduce into
reduced-form results, we then estimate a small structural model of Mex-
ico's financial markets. This allows us to calculate estimates of the offset
coefficient by tracing the effect on the stock of net external claims of
increases in the domestic credit component of the monetary base. The
structural model allows for gradual asset-market adjustment, and thus
allows us to distinguish empirically between the consequences of imper-
fect substitutability and imperfect mobility of capital. Accordingly, we
report estimates of both the short-run or one-quarter offset coefficient
and the long-run offset coefficient. The former gives the fraction of a
monetary expansion reversed by capital outflow in the same quarter on
the assumption that output, the price level, and the futures premium are
predetermined; the latter is a hypothetical construct measuring what the
8. If current real income were instead allowed to be endogenous, responding positively
to a fall in the home interest rate, the offset could be incomplete even in this interest-
inelastic case. It is worth noting that when money demand and money supply are both
interest inelastic, the Kouri-Porter capital flow equation is underidentified. Identification is
lost also when no variables other than the balance of payments enter the monetary policy
reaction function. (The last statement assumes that no prior information is available
concerning the degree of correlation between the disturbances of various equations.) If
domestic credit responds systematically to variables other than the balance of payments,
these variables, if predetermined, may be used as instruments in estimating the reduced-
form capital flow equation by two-stage least squares. An instrumental-variable approach,
which in principle yields consistent parameter estimates, was suggested by Argy and Kouri
(1974). Their estimated offset coefficients were generally similar to those obtained by Kouri
and Porter using ordinary least squares.251 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
short-run offset would be if asset holdings could adjust immediately to
their long-run desired levels.
11.2 The Banco de Mexico's Reaction Function
In this section we examine the extent to which the Banco de Mexico
systematically neutralized the monetary effects of its foreign exchange
intervention. To begin, we describe the construction of a domestic credit
policy variable which summarizes the effects of a variety of instruments
available to the central bank. We next estimate a central bank reaction
function relating the level of this policy variable to a number of mac-
roeconomic targets. The central finding is that a policy of systematic
sterilization appears to have been followed at least during the second half
of the 1970s. Not surprisingly, we find also that credit policy is influenced
strongly by the need to finance the public sector's deficit, and that
seasonal variation in liquidity preference is accommodated by the mone-
tary authority.
To construct a comprehensive measure of monetary policy suited to the
recent Mexican experience, two important adjustments of the published
domestic credit series are required. The first involves the treatment of
decisions to monetize changes in the peso value of the Banco de Mexico's
international reserves. The second incorporates the effects of variations
in the reserve requirements imposed on private banks.
The peso value of the Banco de Mexico's foreign reserves may change
for two reasons other than actual foreign exchange intervention. The first
of these is fluctuations in the market price of gold. Since the second
quarter of 1976, the Banco de Mexico has revalued its gold holdings daily
to reflect prevailing market prices. As a result, the dollar value of gold
holdings increased by more than 500 percent between 1975 and 1979,
while physical gold holdings declined by 45 percent over the same
period.
9 A second source of reserve change in the absence of balance of
payments disequilibrium is exchange rate variation. When the peso-
dollar rate was altered abruptly in 1976, Banco de Mexico experienced a
substantial capital gain, in peso terms, on its holdings of foreign currency
denominated assets. Devaluation, like the gold price increases, inflates
the book value of reserves.
The decision to monetize such capital gains as a means of government
finance is entirely discretionary. The alternative is the creation of a
fictitious accounting liability that offsets the increase in the peso value of
central bank foreign assets without directly increasing the high-powered
money stock. Monetization is thus completely analogous to an increase in
9. Calculations are based on year-end data published in the International Monetary
Fund's International Financial Statistics, lines lad and land.252 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
the domestic assets of the central bank, even though it presupposes a rise
in the peso value of the bank's foreign assets. It should be included in any




Minimum reserve requirements for private banks were varied several
times during the 1970s, and these changes, too, should enter into a
summary measure of domestic credit policy. We incorporate them by
assuming that policymakers think in terms of an adjusted monetary base,
that is, a base adjusted to reflect the effect of average reserve ratio
changes on the volume of demand deposits it supports. (We abstract from
currency in circulation.) The adjusted base at time t, BAt, is given by
BAt= 22$, qt
where q0 is the base-period (1971:1) average reserve ratio, qt the current
reserve ratio, and Bt the unadjusted base, measured in pesos.
1
1 BAt is just
the base that would support a money supply equal to Btlqt were the
average reserve ratio at its base level go-
Letting AFACBf denote the change in central bank foreign assets over
period t (excluding valuation changes) and ADACB,the change in central
bank domestic assets over period t (including monetized capital gains on
foreign reserves), we may write
(1) BAt = BAt_ l + -^- (AFACBf + ADACB, + AB*), qt-i
where AB* = [{qt-\ - qt)/qt]Bt. Because
AB? is the increase in the unadjusted base that would, at reserve ratio
qt-\, bring about the same rise in the volume of demand deposits sup-
ported by Bt as a reduction of the reserve ratio from qt_1 to qt. The quantity (qolqt_x)AB? appearing on the right-hand side of (1) thus mea-
sures the impact of the reserve ratio change on the adjusted base.
Identity (1) suggests a natural measure of overall domestic credit
policy:
(2) AMP, = -^- ADACB, + -^- ABf.
It-i <It-i
We take AMP to be the dependent variable in the Banco de Mexico's
10. The data appendix provides details on the construction of our central bank domestic
asset series. See also Girton and Roper (1977) on the appropriate treatment of capital-gains
monetization.
11. Details on the calculation of the average reserve ratio series used in this study appear
in the appendix.253 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
monetary reaction function, and turn next to a discussion of the appropri-
ate independent variables.
A central bank reaction function should allow for response to a number
of factors in addition to the balance of payments. Monetary policy, as
defined by (2), may respond also to real output fluctuations, to changes in
Mexico's international competitiveness as measured by the real exchange
rate, and to seasonal fluctuations in money demand, for example. Fur-
ther, in the Mexican case, the public sector's borrowing requirement is a
major determinant of domestic credit creation. We therefore specified a
reaction function of the form:
AMP, = fl0 + fli(?o/&-i) AFACBf
3
+ «3A-i + a4\n(y[^1/yt_2) + X a4+iDi + ult.
(3) i=i
In (3), GOVBOR is the consolidated public sector deficit, p = ln(ePUS/
PMex) the log of the real exchange rate, v the index of real industrial
production, and Di a seasonal dummy for the ith quarter. PUS and PMex




When the central bank pursues a systematic sterilization policy, ax is
negative. If ax = -1, the monetary authority seeks to neutralize all
reserve flows through offsetting movements in domestic credit: steriliza-
tion is complete. A positive value of ax indicates that monetary policy is
aimed at external balance.
The role of government deficit financing is particularly important in
Mexico.
1
3 The consolidated public-sector borrowing requirement consists
almost entirely of the central government's borrowing requirement and
the borrowing requirements of "controlled" public enterprises. In gen-
eral, that part of the public sector deficit not financed through external
borrowing must be financed through the domestic banking system. (The
Banco de Mexico, since 1955, has induced private banks to hold a large
portion of the public sector's debt by allowing certain debt holdings to
serve as required reserves.) Because the domestic banking system plays
an important role in deficit financing, we expect the coefficient a2 in (3) to
be positive and significant. However, because public external borrowing
is important as well, we expect a2 to be smaller than 1.
If the monetary authority adopts a competitiveness target, the coeffi-
cient a3 of the lagged real exchange rate should be positive. Thus, when
domestic prices rise more quickly than exchange rate adjusted foreign
12. All variables are defined in detail in the appendix. Financial aggregates are mea-
sured in billions of pesos.
13. We draw on the discussions of government deficit financing in Brothers and Solis
(1966) and Ortiz and Solis (1979).254 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
prices, credit policy becomes more restrictive. If monetary policy is used
to lean against cyclical activity fluctuations, a4 is negative.
Finally, as the major seasonal influence on money demand is the
fourth-quarter increase, the coefficients of the seasonal dummies should
be negative.
The results of estimating the reaction function with quarterly data
appear in table 11.1. The endogeneity of the balance of payments makes
an instrumental variables estimation technique necessary, and two differ-
ent ones were employed. The first of these was Fair's (1970) version of
two-stage least squares (2SLS), which incorporates a correction for first
order serial dependence in the equation's disturbance. The second was
the two-step, two-stage least squares (2S2SLS) procedure proposed by
Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1981). An advantage of 2S2SLS is that
the asymptotic distribution theory it uses to calculate parameter esti-
mates' standard errors is valid under assumptions less restrictive than
those adopted by Fair.
1
4 But both estimation methods should yield con-
sistent parameter estimates in the present setting.
Initially, the specification (3) was used; the results are reported as
equations (A) and (C) in table 11.1. Both estimates give the competitive-
ness term the expected positive sign, but they provide no evidence that
countercyclical considerations influence domestic credit policy. Equa-
tions (B) and (D) present estimates of a reaction function from which the
statistically insignificant competitiveness and cyclical variables have been
excluded. The remaining coefficients exhibited relatively little sensitivity
to this exclusion restriction.
The accommodation of seasonal money demand shifts is apparent in
the estimates, with a strong seasonal expansion in the fourth quarter.
1
5
The public sector borrowing requirement is highly significant in all the
regressions. These indicate that roughly 70 to 85 percent of the overall
public sector deficit is financed through domestic credit creation.
Most importantly, the balance of payments coefficient d1 is negative
and has a marginal significance level lower than .05 in all versions of the
reaction function. Although dx is usually smaller than -1, it is more than
one standard error away from -1 only in equation (D). Thus, one cannot
strongly reject the hypothesis ax = -1. The data suggest that the Banco
de Mexico attempted to control the money stock through full neutraliza-
tion of reserve flows.
14. The standard error estimates produced by 2S2SLS allow for a nonzero covariance
between the estimates of the structural parameters and the estimate of the autoregressive
parameter (denoted by p in table 11.1). In addition, 2S2SLS does not require the absence of
conditional heteroscedasticity, an important problem in standard error estimation when
lagged endogenous variables are used as instruments. Conditional heteroscedasticity is
discussed by Dhrymes (1974, pp. 183-184), Engle (1982), and Hansen (1979), and, in a
cross-sectional context, by White (1980, 1982).
15. This seasonality is reflected in the money demand equation estimated below.255 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
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To investigate the stability of the reaction function, we split our sample
into two subperiods, 1971:3-1975:4 and 1976:1-1979:4. In the first sub-
period there appeared to be no significant relationship between domestic
credit policy and any of the explanatory variables (other than dummies).
The relationship estimated (by Fair's method) over the second subperiod
is similar to those reported in table 11.1:
AMP= 64.6 - 1.362 (qo/q _^ AFACB + .441 (V4-i)GOVBOR
(48.7) (0.584) (.174)
- 122.9 Dx - 29.7 D2 - 114.6 D3,
(95.6) (6.8) (94.8)
£=-0.94, SE = 10.4, R
2 = 0.904.
(0.05)
These results suggest that sterilization was a more important factor in
monetary policy during the second half of the 1970s than during the first
half.
1
6 The finding is consistent with the fact that the range of monetary




We conclude that part of the observed negative correlation between
changes in the domestic and foreign source components of the base is
likely to be the result of official sterilization policy. An implication is that
domestic credit policy responds to the contemporaneous balance of pay-
ments and should not be treated as a predetermined factor in estimating
the capital account offset coefficient.
11.3 A Structural Model of Asset Markets
In this section we estimate a small, aggregative portfolio-balance
model of Mexican financial markets. The model allows the calculation of
both the short-run and long-run offset coefficients. It consists of three
equations: a demand equation for the net external liabilities of the
Mexican private sector, a money demand equation, and a money supply
equation. All equations are based on quarterly data and were estimated
by 2SLS (with Fair's autoregressive correction when necessary) and by
the 2S2SLS procedure. A list of the instruments used is provided in a note
to table 11.2.
16. Bhalla (1981) computes a positive correlation between the balance of payments and
the change in the money stock using annual data for the period 1956-1972. This evidence
also suggests that sterilization was of limited importance before the mid-1970s.
17. Business International (1979) reports that Banco de Mexico has used Certificados de
Tesoreria de la Federation since 1978 and petrobonds since 1977 to conduct open-market
operations. In addition, the move to market valuation of gold reserves in 1976 allowed
greater flexibility in choosing the rate of domestic credit expansion. Prior to these innova-
tions, the monetary authority relied on reserve-requirement changes, special deposits, and
operations in government securities within the banking system (see Brothers and Solis
1966). Only the last of these was employed with any frequency.257 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
Both the money and external liability demand equations relate desired
asset holdings to the expected return on foreign assets. An important
component of this return is the expected depreciation of the peso relative
to foreign currency. The presence of a large, discrete devaluation of the
peso in 1976:3 poses a problem, for it is unlikely that the devaluation was
completely unanticipated, or that anticipations of exchange rate move-
ments were a minor determinant of capital flows in 1976-1977. Indeed,
figure 11.1 presents striking evidence that the devaluation of 1976 was
preceded by a sizable anticipatory outflow of capital.
To capture the impact of exchange rate expectations, we used the
premium on three-month peso futures as an explanatory variable in our
empirical equations.
1
8 This premium does reflect the anticipation of a
devaluation for several quarters preceding 1976:3, but was always sub-
stantially smaller than the realized parity change. This is not surprising in
view of the uncertain date of the peso's devaluation.
1
9
Each equation is now discussed in turn. At the end of the section, the
implied offset coefficients are calculated.
11.3.1 Net Foreign Liabilities
We assume that the real peso value of the desired stock of net external
liabilities, eF
d/FMex, may be written as a function of domestic and
foreign interest rates, domestic real income, and domestic real wealth:
(4) -^— = 3>(r, r* + /, y, W/PMex) + u2.
PMex
In (4), r is the domestic interest rate, r* the foreign rate, / the premium
on peso futures, and W nominal Mexican wealth.
2
0 We assume that
Mexican participants comprise a sufficiently small share of the world
financial market that the foreign interest rate may be taken as exogenous.
18. The futures rate is expressed in pesos per dollar; and the futures premium is the
percent excess of the futures rate over the spot rate e (on an annualized basis). The futures
premium can be interpreted as an indicator of exchange rate expectations or as the cost of
forward cover. The two interpretations, of course, need not conflict. We use the futures
premium rather than the forward premium used by Lizondo (chapter 10 of this volume)
because there is a longer series of observations available for the former variable. Jacob
Frenkel has suggested that the futures premium may measure exchange rate expectations
with error. The two-step, two-stage leasf squares estimates (but not Fair's method esti-
mates) reported below yield consistent parameter estimates even when all asset returns are
measured with random, serially uncorrelated error. See Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld
(1981) on the procedure to employ when an equation with errors in variables is corrected for
autoregressive dependence of its structural disturbance.
19. Lizondo (1983) shows how the futures premium may underpredict an anticipated
future devaluation if agents have rational expectations and are uncertain about the timing
(but not the magnitude) of the devaluation.
20. All rate-of-return variables are measured in units of percent per annum. We are
assuming here that domestic and covered foreign bonds are imperfect substitutes because of
political risk. See Aliber (1973) and Dooley and Isard (1980). After the August 1982
devaluation, the Mexican government did in fact take measures penalizing holders of U.S.
dollar denominated assets within its jurisdiction.258 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
In addition, we assume that foreign holdings of peso-denominated assets
are negligible, so that we may ignore the effects of foreign income and
wealth. To incorporate the possibility of imperfect capital mobility, we
suppose that agents need not adjust portfolio shares instantaneously to
their full optimum level, but instead succeed in making a fraction \ of the
adjustment each period. Thus,
(5) eF/PMex -e.1F.l /PMex _ x = K(eF
d/?Mex -e_1F_1 /PMex _ x),
where F is the actual stock of net foreign liabilities, measured in dollars.
Combining equations (4) and (5) and linearizing, we obtain the equa-
tion to be estimated,
lIL
 eF^ + b2rt + b3(r? + ft) + b4yt PMex,
where b1 - 1 — \, and e2f = \u2t- A rise in the home interest rate induces an inflow of capital or an increase in net external liabilities, so b2>0.
Similarly, £>3<0. An increase in domestic real income augments the
transactions demand for money and causes a decline in desired holdings
of foreign assets, so b4 > 0. Finally, an increase in domestic wealth leads to
a reduction in external liabilities, and thus, b5<0.
The results of estimating (6) are reported in table 11.2.
2
1 They provide
evidence that capital flows are quite sensitive to the domestic interest rate
even in the short run. The two techniques yield very similar parameter
estimates, although those obtained by 2S2SLS appear to be more precise.
All interest rate coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at
the 5 percent level. Equation (B), for example, suggests that a 100 basis
point rise in the home interest rate, all else equal, induces a capital inflow
of 1.2 billion real pesos in the same quarter, while an equal increase in the
covered foreign rate induces a 0.25 billion real peso outflow. Both esti-
mates of the adjustment parameter \ are near 0.35. Again using equation
(B), the long-run capital inflow occasioned by a 100 basis point rise in r is
3.9 billion real pesos, while the outflow following an equal increase in
r* +f is 0.83 billion real pesos.
The wealth variable has the anticipated sign and is significant at the 5
percent level in both equations. Equation (B) suggests that approxi-
mately 15 percent of an increase in wealth is allocated to foreign assets
within one quarter. The long-run portfolio share is 50 percent.
11.3.2 Money Demand
The demand for narrowly defined real money (Ml) balances is
assumed to depend on the domestic and foreign covered interest rates,
21. The domestic income variable had a small and very insignificant coefficient. It was
therefore omitted from the equation reported in table 11.2.259 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
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real income, and real wealth. Thus, long-run desired money holdings may
be written as
M =A(r,r*+f,y, MPMex) + u3.
PMex
Invoking the partial adjustment mechanism and linearizing as before, we
obtain the empirical specification,
PMexf_x
c4yt
where 1 — c1 is again the adjustment parameter. As usual, we expect c2,
c3<0, and c4, c5>0.
The results of estimating (7) appear in table 11.3.
2
2 As before, the 2SLS
and the 2S2SLS estimates are quite similar. Table 11.3 reports two
versions of the money demand equation. In (A) and (B) we estimate the
money demand equation without imposing coefficient constraints, while
in (C) and (D) the two rate-of-return coefficients are constrained to be
equal. In neither of the latter two equations is the constraint rejected by
the data. When the constraint is imposed, the coefficient on the interest
rates is significant at the 5 percent level. In the unconstrained equation
only the coefficient on the covered foreign interest rate is significant.
The adjustment of real balances to long-run desired levels is estimated
to be approximately 20 percent per quarter. Equation (D), for example,
suggests that a 100 basis point increase in either rate of return leads to a
0.3 billion peso decrease in real money demand in the same quarter and a
1.4 billion peso decrease in real money demand in the long run.
As expected, an increase in real income raises real money demand. At
the sample means of v and M/PMex, the income elasticity of money
demand derived from equation (D) is 0.42 in the short run and 1.94 in the
long run. The empirical equation also contains seasonal dummies, which
reveal a marked seasonality in money demand. It is this seasonal varia-
tion that gives rise to the significant seasonal dummies in the Banco de
Mexico's domestic credit policy function.
11.3.3 Money Supply
The model's monetary sector includes a money supply function relating
the supply of real Ml to the real monetary base. We assume that the
supply of money by the private banking system may be written as a
function of the monetary base (adjusted for reserve requirements as
22. Domestic wealth has been dropped from the equation, as its coefficient was small
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Table 11.4 Mexico: Money Supply (1971:3-1979:4)"




"Standard errors are in parentheses. Mean of dependent variable is 104.8 billion 1975 pesos.
See footnote to table 11.2 for instruments.
described in section 11.2) and of the opportunity cost of holding excess
reserves. When linearized, the money supply function takes the form,
(8) . -^- = dQ + dlrt + d2-^
L- +u4t.
PMex, PMex,
Estimates of the parameters of (8) are reported in table 11.4.
2
3 The
coefficient of the real, adjusted base is quite small, reflecting both high
marginal reserve requirements on demand deposits (in place throughout
the estimation period) and banks' practice of holding sizable excess
reserves.
2
4 The high interest sensitivity of money supply is also consistent
with the existence of significant excess reserves.
11.3.4 The Offset Coefficient
The estimated coefficients of the structural equations may be used to
calculate the capital account offset to domestic credit expansion. Two
types of monetary expansion are considered. The first is an increase in
domestic credit accomplished through an open-market-type asset swap
that leaves private financial wealth unchanged. The second is a helicop-
ter-type increase in credit that is accompanied by an equal increase in
private financial wealth. Because our empirical money demand function
does not include domestic wealth as an argument, we would expect
the offset associated with the latter type of operation to be the greater
one. Indeed, were b5 equal to -1, the offset to a helicopter increase
in domestic credit would be complete, even with limited asset
substitutability.
In both cases the offset coefficient is (minus) the total derivative of net
foreign liabilities with respect to an increase in DACB. Table 11.5A
contains the short-run offset coefficients for both types of credit expan-
sion, computed from the two sets of parameter estimates using the
23. There was no evidence of a lag in the adjustment of the money supply to its long-run
level. The Banco de Mexico discount rate was constant at 5 percent over the sample period,
and therefore is omitted from the money supply equation.
24. Business International (1979) attributes this practice to the extremely limited re-
course of commercial banks to rediscounting at the central bank. Generally, only certain
export bills are discountable.263 Capital
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aOffset coefficients are calculated at base period reserve requirements. The capital account
offset to an open-market-type credit expansion is given by
(9) (qolq,) b2d2/[(d1 - c2) + (qjq,)b2d2].
The offset coefficient for the helicopter-type expansion is
,10) (qo/qt)b2d2 + b5(c2 - dx) {qjqt)b2d2 + («*i - c2)
constrained money demand equations. The short-run offset coefficients
imply that, while substantial, the capital account offset to a monetary
expansion was considerably less than complete. At the initial reserve
ratio, anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of an increase in domestic credit by
the Banco de Mexico was offset by capital outflow within a quarter, with
the exact figure depending on the method through which the domestic
credit increase was effected. For example, to achieve a 1 billion peso
increase in the monetary base through helicopter money creation, a
1.7-2 billion peso expansion of domestic credit was required. As ex-
pected, the computed offsets to a helicopter-type expansion exceed those
to an open-market-type expansion, in both cases by approximately 10
percentage points. The offset coefficients derived from the Fair's method
estimates exceed those derived from the 2S2SLS estimates. This differ-
ence is the result of the greater domestic interest rate sensitivity of capital
flows implied by the former set of estimates.
It is also of interest to calculate the offset in a hypothetical world in
which portfolio adjustment occurs instantaneously. Replacing the para-
meters in (9) and (10) with their corresponding long-run values, we
obtain "long-run" offset coefficients in all cases between 50 and 76
percent (see table 11.5B). The computed "long-run" offsets to open-
market-type expansions are in the lower end of this range, and those
corresponding to helicopter-type expansions are near 76 percent. It
should be stressed that we are using the term "long run" in a limited sense
to signify only the complete adjustment of asset stocks to their desired
values.264 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
The estimates indicate that the Banco de Mexico could exercise con-
siderable short-run control over the domestic money stock and domestic
credit market conditions during the 1970s, but only at the cost of high
reserve volatility.
11.4 Expectations and the Futures Premium
The preceding analysis, while recognizing the role of the futures price
as an indicator of exchange rate expectations, has negelcted both the
possible influence of the home interest rate on the futures premium and
the endogeneity of expectations. The offset to monetary policy has been
calculated on the assumption that a one-time expansion of domestic
credit leaves the futures premium unchanged.
How might monetary expansion affect the futures premium? By lower-
ing the domestic interest rate, monetary expansion would induce capital
outflows and, at the initial forward rate, an excess demand for future
pesos calling for a rise in their equilibrium price. As an appreciation of
the peso on the futures market discourages capital outflow, the offset
coefficient would be lower than calculated in the previous section if
covered interest arbitrage were incorporated into the model.
Speculative transactions are also an important determinant of the
futures price, however, and the activities of speculators would tend to
raise the offset coefficient calculated in section 11.3. Monetary expansion
raises the likelihood of devaluation by reducing the central bank's inter-
national reserves and encouraging domestic expenditure. Speculators
would respond by selling the peso forward, thus enhancing the profit-
ability of capital outflows.
Theoretically, the net effect on the futures price of these two types of
activity—interest arbitrage and speculation—is indeterminate. But as an
empirical matter, we could find no strong evidence that contempo-
raneous domestic interest rates affected the futures premium during the
1970s. Expectations regarding the future level of the exchange rate did
seem to be an important determinant of the futures premium, however.
In particular, lagged deviations from purchasing power parity exerted a
persistent and strong effect on the futures premium, with lagged real
exchange rate appreciation leading to forward depreciation of the peso.
Letting p = ln(ePUS/PMex) again denote the natural logarithm of the
real exchange rate, we estimated the following relationship between the
futures premium on dollars,/, and past changes in the real exchange rate
between 1974:2 and 1979:4:
Jf= 45.209 - 6.479 Apt_x -14.803 Ap,_2-11.669 Apf_3 (12.708) (1.324) (4.608) (4.022)
- 6.288 Ap,_4- 7.175 Ap,_5,
(3.250) (2.071)265 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
p = 0.930 , SE = 0.927 , R
2 = 0.740
(0.079)
(standard errors are in parentheses). The correlations between the fu-
tures premium and lagged values of the purchasing power parity gap are
extremely high. They suggest that any decline in the competitiveness of
Mexican exports occasioned forward speculation against the peso and a
rise in the price of forward dollars.
2
5
This strong evidence that expectational factors influenced the forward
premium indicates that our offset estimates probably understate the true
offset.
11.5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the capital account offset to monetary policy
faced by the Banco de Mexico during the decade 1970-1980. Using a
small structural model of Mexican financial markets, we found that
roughly 30-50 percent of a domestic credit increase leaked away through
the capital account within a quarter, with the precise figure depending on
the method of domestic credit expansion adopted. This incomplete offset
was the result of imperfect mobility of capital as well as imperfect substi-
tutability between peso-denominated assets and assets denominated in
foreign currencies. The offset coefficient would have been substantially
higher under instantaneous portfolio adjustment.
These findings suggest that the Mexican central bank possessed some
degree of short-run control over the monetary base in spite of the fixity of
the exchange rate. While short-run monetary control implies an ability to
neutralize the liquidity effects of transitory reserve fluctuations, it does
not imply an ability to resist the adjustments needed to eliminate sus-
tained disequilibria in the balance of payments. Conclusions as to the
scope for long-run monetary control cannot be drawn from our partial-
equilibrium, financial-sector model, which neglects the current account
effects of international wealth flows and changes in home borrowing
costs. The sharp reserve losses preceding the 1976 and 1982 devaluations
provide convincing evidence against the hypothesis that the Banco de
Mexico enjoyed any long-run independence from monetary develop-
ments abroad.
Estimates of a Banco de Mexico reaction function provided strong
evidence of official sterilization activities during the 1970s. Although the
reaction function exhibited instability when estimated over subperiods of
the decade, the Banco de Mexico seems to have pursued a policy of full
neutralization of reserve movements, at least since early 1976. The
pursuit of sterilization under conditions of substantial capital account
25. The contemporaneous real exchange rate exerted no significant effect on the futures
premium. This is probably the result of lags in the reporting of price level figures.266 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
sensitivity helped give rise to periods of considerable reserve volatility
during the decade under study.
Appendix
The following data were employed in this study:
B: High-powered money in billions of pesos. The series is the sum of
currency and the reserve deposits of deposit banks in the Banco de
Mexico, including securities held at the Banco de Mexico in fulfillment of
reserve requirements. Source: Indicadores Economicos, various issues,
for data from 1974:1 to 1979:4. From 1970:4 to 1973:4, currency in
circulation is taken from Indicadores Economicos and bank reserves from
Informe Anual.
BA: Adjusted stock of high-powered money, equal to (qolqt)Bt.
Di, D2, D3: Seasonal dummies taking the value of 1 in the ith quarter
(i — 1, 2, 3) and zero in other quarters.
ADACB: Change in central bank domestic assets. Calculated as
AB-AFACB. Included are monetized capital gains on international
reserves.
e: End-of-period exchange rate, in pesos per dollar. Source: Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (IFS), line ae.
/: End-of-quarter premium on peso futures for delivery three months
forward, measured in percent per annum. The premium is set at zero
prior to 1974:2. Source: International Money Market Yearbook, various
issues.
F: Private Mexican net external liabilities, in billions of dollars, calcu-
lated as the cumulated STCF + LTCF.
AFACB: Change in reserves of the Banco de Mexico, excluding valua-
tion changes. Calculated as etARt.
GOVBOR: Consolidated borrowing requirement of the Mexican
public sector (defined as the central government plus "controlled" public
enterprises), in billions of pesos. Source: Ministry of Finance.
LTCF: Surplus on long-term private capital account, excluding direct
foreign investment, in billions of dollars. Source: Indicadores Economi-
cos, various issues.
M: Narrowly defined money Ml, in billions of pesos. Source: Indica-
dores Economicos and Informe Anual, various issues.
PMex: Mexican CPI, 1975 = 1.00. Source: IFS, line 64.
PUS: United States CPI, 1975 = 1.00. Source: IFS, line 64.
q: Weighted average reserve requirement. End-of-quarter stocks of
various domestic and foreign liabilities of the Mexican financial system
are used to weight the marginal reserve requirement for each type of
deposit. When more than one reserve requirement is published for a267 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
given type of deposit (depending, e.g., on location of the issuing institu-
tion) , some effort is made to choose the rate which is likely to apply to the
majority of deposits in that category. In addition, the series is adjusted so
that qt = qt_\ if no change is made in legislated reserve requirements.
Source: Indicadores Economicos for 1972:4-1979:4; Informe Anual for
1971:1-1972:3.
r: Domestic interest rate, measured in percent per annum. The rate
chosen is the gross yield on financier a bonds for 1971:1-1973:4 and the
gross yield on three-month certificates of deposit from 1974:1-1979:4.
Source: Indicadores Economicos.
r*: Three-month London Eurodollar rate, measured in percent per
annum. Source: IFS, line 60d.
AR: Change in foreign exchange reserves of the Banco de Mexico, in
billions of dollars. The reserve series is taken from the balance of pay-
ments data in Indicadores Economicos and is based on a constant valua-
tion of gold.
STCF: Short-term private capital account surplus, in billions of
dollars. The series includes the errors and omissions in the bal-
ance of payments until 1977:1, when short-term capital flows and errors
and omissions were first published separately. Source: Indicadores
Economicos.
y: Mexican index of industrial production. Source: IFS, line 66.
YUS: U.S. disposable income (nominal). Source: IFS, line 99a.
W: Mexican financial wealth, calculated as Bt + (-etFt).
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Comment Jacob A. Frenkel
The paper "Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization: Mexico in
the 1970s" by Robert Cumby and Maurice Obstfeld represents a signifi-
cant contribution to the literature on the scope for an independent
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monetary policy under a pegged exchange rate regime. After pointing out
the possible biases in earlier estimates of the offset coefficient (measuring
the extent to which the effects of domestic credit policy on the money
supply are being offset by losses of international reserves through the
balance of payments), the authors develop and estimate a structural
model for Mexico and compute the relevant offset coefficient for the
decade of the 1970s. My own comments are divided into three parts. The
first deals with econometric issues and with the sources of the bias in
previous reduced-form estimates; the second deals with the structural
model, and the third with the estimated offset coefficient.
Estimating the Offset Coefficient: Econometric Issues
A typical reduced-form equation used to estimate the offset coefficient
is presented in equation (1).
(1) ARt = a0
where Ai?f denotes changes in international reserves during period t, ADt
denotes changes in the domestic assets component of the monetary base,
Xt denotes a vector of other factors that induce changes in international
reserves, and ut denotes an error term. In equation (1) the parameter a2 is
being referred to as the offset coefficient; it is a measure of the degree to
which changes in the domestic asset component of the monetary base
(AD) are offset by changes in the stock of international reserves (A/?). A
negative value of a2 indicates that losses of reserves offset the effects of
credit expansion, and when a2 = — 1, the offset is complete.
As emphasized by Cumby and Obstfeld, to the extent that domstic
credit policy is influenced by the state of the balance of payments,
ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates of a2 will be biased. The depen-
dence of domestic credit policy on the balance of payments is usually
rationalized by noting that the monetary authority may wish to sterilize
the consequences of the balance of payments. Such a sterilization func-
tion is described in equation (2):
(2) ADt = b0 + b1Yt + b2ARt + vt,
where Yt denotes a vector of other factors determining credit policy, and
vt denotes an error term. In equation (2), b2 is being referred to as the
sterilization coefficient. A negative value of b2 indicates that the mone-
tary authority attempts to sterilize the monetary consequences of reserve
flows, and when b2 — — 1, sterilization is complete. As is evident, when
the behavior of the monetary authority is characterized by equation (2)
with b2 < 0, ADt would be correlated with ut, and the OLS estimate of the
offset coefficient, a2 in equation (1), would generally be biased downward
(algebraically). This is the nature of the bias which has been frequently271 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
discussed in the literature (e.g., Magee 1976) and which is also reiterated
by Cumby and Obstfeld.
If the monetary authority employs its domestic credit policy to attain
a target level of international reserves rather than to sterilize the mone-
tary consequences of the balance of payments, the direction of the bias is
likely to be reversed. For example, consider the following reaction
function:
(3) AA = c0 + cx Zt + c2(Rt - R*) + 6,,
where Rt and R* denote actual and desired stocks of international re-
serves, Zt denotes other factors determining credit policy, and et denotes
an error term. In equation (3) c2 is likely to be positive, suggesting that
when the holdings of reserves exceed the target level, the monetary
authorities expend credit and thereby induce a decline in the stock of
reserves toward the target level. As is evident, when the behavior of the
monetary authorities is characterized by equation (3), with c2>0, the
OLS estimate of the offset coefficient, a2 in equation (1), would generally
be biased upward (algebraically). A reaction function of the type de-
scribed by equation (3) was estimated by Ujiie (1978) and Lau (1980).
These estimates showed that, for the cases studied, the parameter c2 was
significantly positive. In general, it seems that domestic credit policy is
influenced by the considerations which underlie equation (2) as well as by
those which underlie equation (3). Consequently, while the OLS esti-
mate of equation (1) may yield biased estimates of a2, the direction of the
bias may not be stated on a priori grounds.
Independent of the detailed specification of the reaction function, the
OLS estimate of equation (1) will be biased if the error term ut is
correlated with the error term in the reaction function. It is clear, there-
fore, that to obtain consistent estimates of the offset coefficient, the
simultaneity of the various relationships has to be taken into account.
There are, in principle, two ways to obtain consistent estimates. First,
one could estimate equations (1) and (2), or (1) and (3), simultaneously
as in Ujiie (1978) and Lau (1980); alternatively, one could proceed along
the lines of Cumby and Obstfeld and estimate a structural model of the
economy and then derive the implied offset coefficient. The choice
between the two approaches reflects the usual trade-off between reduced
form and structural estimates. On the one hand, estimates based on a
structural model permit an interpretation of the results in terms of the
structural parameters; on the other hand, however, confidence in these
estimates depends on one's confidence in the detailed specifications of the
structural model. It might be useful, therefore, to supplement the struc-
tural model estimate by an estimate of the reduced form as obtained from
a simultaneous estimation of equations (1) and (2), or (1) and (3), or (1)272 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
and a combination of (2) and (3). If the two sets of estimates yielded
similar results, then the interpretation in terms of the structural pa-
rameters would gain credibility. If, however, the two sets of estimates
differed greatly from each other, then it seems that some more questions
concerning the detailed specifications of the structural model will have to
be answered.
The Structural Model
The structural model is composed of three building blocks: a demand
equation for the net external liabilities, a money demand equation, and a
money supply equation. The model is estimated using quarterly data over
the period 1971:3-1979:4. Since, however, the authors provide some
evidence indicating instability in the Banco de Mexico's reaction function
(evidence which is also documented by Porzecanski 1979), it would be
useful to examine whether the structural model remained stable through-
out the decade.
Net Foreign Liabilities
In specifying the demand for net foreign liabilities, Cumby and Obst-
feld assume that asset holders adjust the composition of their portfolios to
the desired composition only gradually. Specifically, for a given value of
wealth, asset holders are assumed to make up each period a fraction \ of
the disequilibrium. This fraction is estimated to be between 30 to 40
percent of the discrepancy between desired and actual composition. As a
theoretical matter, it is not easy to envisage the precise nature of the cost
which induces this type of adjustment to portfolio composition equilib-
rium. More importantly, as an empirical matter it is extremely difficult to
separate out changes in asset holdings into those associated with the
restoration of the desired composition and those associated with the
attainment of the desired size of the portfolio, and theoretically, the
former is likely to proceed at a much faster speed than the latter. It is not
unlikely, therefore, that the estimated speed reflects both types of
adjustment.
Throughout their study the authors provide the results of two estima-
tion procedures. The first procedure is Fair's version of two-stage least
squares; the second procedure is a two-step, two-stage least squares
(2S2SLS) as proposed by Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld. The two
procedures have yielded similar parameter estimates. For the case at
hand the similarity among the estimates is especially reassuring since one
of the determinants of the demand for foreign liabilities is the futures
premium on foreign exchange which is being used as a proxy for expecta-
tions. To the extent that this proxy measured expectations with an error,
Fair's method would have resulted in inconsistent estimates. The 2S2SLS273 Capital Mobility and the Scope for Sterilization
method yielding similar estimates suggests that in the present case the
errors in variables problem is not severe.
One of the interesting results in table 11.2 concerns the different
responses of capital flows to changes in the domestic rate of interest and
to changes in the covered foreign rate of interest. Other things being
equal, a 100 basis point rise in the domestic rate of interest is estimated to
induce (using the 2S2SLS procedure) capital inflow of 1.16 billion (real)
pesos in the same quarter, while an equivalent rise in the covered foreign
rate of interest is estimated to induce an outflow of only 0.25 billion (real)
pesos. This difference suggests that for the case of Mexico it would be
inappropriate to follow the convention of specifying capital flows as a
function of covered interest differential; rather it suggests that one needs
to decompose the differential into its components. To gain some idea of
the orders of magnitude, one may note by inspection of figure 11.1 that
these flows are usually smaller than the typical quarterly changes in
Banco de Mexico's foreign assets.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the estimated value of the autocorrelation
coefficient, p, (using the 2S2SLS procedure) is -0.866. This estimate is
much more negative than the customary estimates. It may reflect the
difficulties of estimating jointly a speed of adjustment A. and the autocor-
relation coefficient p.
The Demand for Money
Analogously with the specification of the demand for foreign liabilities,
the authors postulate a stock adjustment model of the demand for
money. The speed of adjustment is estimated to be about 20 percent per
quarter. Since the adjustments of both money and foreign assets are
carried out by the same asset holders, it would be useful to provide a
formal link between the two speeds. Once such a link is established, it
would be useful to estimate the dynamic equations jointly subject to the
implied cross-equation constraints. The desirability of this procedure is
exemplified by noting that the long-run effects of a rise in the domestic
interest rate on capital inflows is about 3.9 billion (real) pesos (based on
equation [B] in table 11.2) while the corresponding decline in money
holdings is only 1.4 billion (real) pesos (based on equation [D] in table
11.3). It would be useful to account for this long-run difference within the
context of the model.
The specification of the demand for money states that money holdings
depend on the expected holding cost. The authors stress two relevant
costs corresponding to two margins of substitution. They include the
domestic nominal rate of interest to capture the substitution between
money and domestic bonds, while the inclusion of the covered foreign
nominal rate of interest represents the substitution between money and274 Robert E. Cumby/Maurice Obstfeld
foreign bonds. However, when various parity conditions are satisfied,
these two rates of interest are not independent of each other. Specifically,
when the requisite conditions for covered interest arbitrage hold, these
rates are likely to be highly collinear. It is possible, therefore, that this
collinearity might be responsible in part for the imprecise estimate of the
domestic interest elasticity of the demand for money.
Finally, it may be noted that the various estimates in table 11.3 suggest
that the long-run income elasticity of the demand for money exceeds 2.
This value seems to be somewhat high in comparison with corresponding
estimates for other countries as well as for Mexico (e.g., Blejer 1975). It is
not unlikely that a joint estimation of the speeds of adjustment in the
various markets could yield a higher estimated speed in the money
market and, correspondingly, a lower value of the long-run income
elasticity.
The Money Supply
In estimating the money supply function, the authors have imposed the
constraint (which is not rejected by the data) that the supply is not subject
to a lagged adjustment process and that the two primary factors gov-
erning the supply are the monetary base and the rate of interest. The
estimates in table 11.4 reveal a high interest elasticity (exceeding 2.2) and
a low elasticity with respect to the base (about unity). The estimated unit
elasticity is, however, consistent with other findings (e.g., Blejer 1975).
Of special interest is the estimate of p, the autocorrelation coefficient.
This is the only case in the study in which estimating the autocorrelation
coefficient yielded a positive value of p. By the same token, the money
supply function is the only building block of the structural model which
does not include in the estimation a lagged dependent variable represent-
ing a stock adjustment process. I believe that these two facts might be
intimately related. The difficulties in estimating a speed of adjustment
along with an autocorrelation coefficient are well known, and it is possi-
ble that when the lagged dependent variable is included, it picks up "too
much" of the serial correlation and thus yielding a negative estimate of p
(as in table 11.2). On the other hand, when the lagged dependent variable
is not included, the resulting positive estimate of p captures the "true"
nature of the serial correlation (as in table 11.4). These considerations
provide an additional reason for attempting a further examination of the
estimated speeds of adjustment.
The Offset Coefficient
Having estimated the three building blocks of the structural model, the
authors have computed the offset coefficient as (minus) the total deriva-
tive of net foreign liabilities with respect to a change in the domestic asset
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credit yields a new equilibrium rate of interest that clears the money
market. This equilibrium rate of interest, which is found with the aid of
the estimated money demand and money supply functions, is then substi-
tuted into the net foreign liabilities function from which the offset
through capital flows is being determined. It is clear, therefore, that the
computation of the offset coefficient, as in equations (9)-(10) of Cumby
and Obstfeld's paper, involves all the estimates of the interest rate
coefficients. Following this procedure, the "long-run" offset coefficient
to open market policy is computed to be about 50 percent. Intuitively,
this estimate seems to be somewhat low. The payoff to the authors'
structural model estimation is that one can identify the sources of possible
biases in the final estimate. Specifically, a given expansion of credit
lowers the rate of interest in an inverse proportion to the interest elastic-
ity of the supply of money and in an inverse proportion to the (absolute
value of the) interest elasticity of the demand for money. The resultant
capital flow, in turn, depends positively on the interest elasticity of the net
foreign liabilities function. It follows that an overestimation of the sensi-
tivity of the demand or of the supply of money to changes in the rate of
interest, as well as an underestimation of the interest sensitivity of capital
flows, will result in an underestimation of the offset coefficient. Since the
authors' definition of capital flows includes the item measuring errors and
omissions in the balance of payments, it is unlikely that the elasticity of
capital flows is being significantly underestimated. My speculation is that
to the extent that the offset coefficient is being underestimated, the
source of the bias would be found in the overestimation of the interest
elasticity of the demand for money. As indicated before, the high value of
the estimated long-run elasticity may be attributed, in part, to the ex-
tremely low estimate of the speed of adjustment. Furthermore, as recog-
nized by the authors, allowance for the endogeneity of the futures pre-
mium on foreign exchange is also likely to yield a higher value of the
long-run offset coefficient.
In conclusion, I wish to reiterate my opening remarks. This paper
represents a significant contribution to the study of the scope for steriliza-
tion. I have found the empirical research extremely well designed and
professionally executed. As such, I believe that it could serve as a model
for the proper way to study and estimate the offset coefficient.
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